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This article explores the history of North American educational research in an attempt to
offer readers a historically informed view of the field as a whole. The first part of the article
situates many of the major research programs in their original social settings, showing how
they emerged in response to various administrative and academic pressures. The second
part acknowledges the textual underpinnings of educational research by underscoring the
practical reality that researchers produce patterned forms of text, which are used in
patterned social situations to accomplish anticipated goals.
Cet article porte sur l’histoire de la recherche en éducation en Amérique du Nord et se veut
un aperçu historique du domaine dans son intégralité. Dans un premier temps, l’article
situe plusieurs des programmes de recherche les plus importants dans leur contexte social
original et démontre leur évolution en réaction à diverses pressions de nature
administrative et académique. L’article évoque ensuite les fondements textuels qui
sous-tendent la recherche en éducation en soulignant que les éléments pratiques de la
réalité font en sorte que les chercheurs produisent des textes selon des schémas donnés et
qui sont par la suite employés dans des situations sociales structurées pour réaliser des
objectifs anticipés.
The ways of doing educational research continue to grow in complexity and
number, posing serious challenges to scholars, particularly graduate students,
attempting to make sense of the epistemic terrain of the field as a whole
(Callahan, 1962; Cronbach, 1957; Eisner, 1985; Lagemann, 2000). Unfortunately,
institutional support for teaching encompassing perspectives of the field is
sparse. According to Pallas (2001), graduate students in education at large
universities usually gain their training in local communities of practice made
up of a small number of faculty and students, all of whom implicitly share
roughly the same epistemic paradigm and therefore find little reason to ex-
amine it critically in the light of alternative options. As a result, silos form—dif-
ferent sequences of methods courses, different brown-bag lunches, different
professional affiliations—leaving students and faculty of one paradigm largely
insulated from those of another.
This article proceeds from the assumption that a more direct addressing of
the epistemic landscape of North American educational research will in the
long run benefit everyone involved—from the graduate student struggling to
formulate a research prospectus to the committee in charge of evaluating it, to
the policymakers influenced by the findings. To this end, I begin this article by
exploring some of the major research methods that have shaped North
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American education over the past century. In the second half of this article I
offer an approach to educational research that emphasizes the practical reality
that, as researchers, we are called to produce certain kinds of texts for certain
kinds of audiences in order to accomplish our professional goals. I then situate
some of the research methods in their traditional social settings and highlight
some of the interesting features that are revealed in the process.
This is, of course, a discussion in broad strokes, one that simplifies the rich
history of North American educational research and necessarily neglects many
alternative readings of that history in order to offer a conceptual framework of
potential value to the reader. My hope is that readers will find in the first half
of this article a useful overview of many of the major research methods used in
North American education, and in the second half a useful theoretical frame-
work for making sense of those methods and effectively choosing among them
in future situations. This is also an article of encouragement for those who see
the role of writing in research as more than one of simply “writing up the
findings”—for those who have entertained the idea that it is the writing itself,
the anticipated communicative act, that should shape the choice of research
method in the first place.
Surveying the Landscape of North American Educational Research
Research Programs: 1900-1960
Modern educational research was born out of the need for school superinten-
dents to defend their decisions against mounting public criticism led by
businessmen and politicians whose business-industrial ideology was sweeping
North America at the turn of the 20th century (Callahan, 1962). Facing a public
weary of increased taxes resulting from the “guesswork” of educators, many
superintendents adopted an efficiency model based on the widely hailed prin-
ciples of Frederick Taylor’s scientific management. This model relied on ef-
ficiency experts and other researchers to lend a scientific basis to administrative
decisions by accurately measuring and analyzing quantifiable features of
school operation. Some accepted the systematic observations of in-house re-
searchers; others relied more heavily on surveys, popularized by Hall’s recent
development of the modern questionnaire (de Landsheere, 1997; Lagemann,
2000). In either case, correlational and descriptive statistical studies flourished,
and with Fisher’s (1925) development of the analysis of variance, efficiency
experts and researchers began to replace the laborious description of “school
facts” with reliable statistical inferences drawn from educational data sets
(Howie, 1999; Rucci & Tweney, 1980; Skipper, Guenther, & Nass, 1970). The
experiential judgment of the teacher was replaced in large part by the large-
scale quantitative practices that had given the United States its economic edge,
and decisions ranging from curricular changes to classroom sizes were fre-
quently made on the newly justified grounds of fiscal solvency (Callahan,
1962).
With the 1930s came the passing of the efficiency movement, and the initial
enthusiasm for the experimentation of the 1920s was tempered by difficulties
in harvesting meaningful quantitative data from all but the most sterile set-
tings. Campbell and Stanley (1963) noted “defections from experimentation to
essay writing” during this time (p. 2): Dismayed by the state of experimental
research in controlled settings, many academic psychologists turned their at-
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tention to the mental life of school children in situ and adopted naturalistic
methods such as introspection, observation, and narrative reporting. Accord-
ing to Kendler (1987), some researchers combined the practices of phenomenol-
ogy and experimentation by writing detailed narrative reports of simple
laboratory demonstrations (Kohler, 1929; Wertheimer, 1945). Others remained
committed to controlled experimentation as the only route to reliable educa-
tional knowledge despite the initially disappointing results (Monroe, 1938),
others turned to correlational studies (Cronbach, 1957), and still others began
to reject the possibility of a scientific basis for educational inquiry altogether
(Johanningmeier, 1969).
Over time, many educators turned to the intellectual leaders of their field
for an educational vision that would repair their own epistemological and
ideological fractures and offer a sustainable research program commensurate
with the relatively scarce research funds of the time (de Landsheere, 1997).
With notable exceptions, two paradigmatic camps stabilized: Those who were
enticed by the prospect of an objective educational science remained com-
mitted to the educational psychology of Thorndike; those who resonated with
the idea of reconstructing a new social order through progressive schooling
tended toward the educational philosophy of John Dewey (Lagemann, 2000).
A Columbia-trained psychologist, Thorndike (1914/1921) conceived of the
mind as a massive collection of differentiated “neurones” organized into
stimulus-response bonds, not unlike the wires of a telephone switchboard. This
materialist, mechanical metaphor lent a directness to the interaction between
stimuli and responses that displaced intentionality from the purview of educa-
tion (Joncich, 1962). Thus original nature was nothing more than the product of
a common collection of stimulus-response bonds, which when left on their
own developed into socially undesirable behavior: “what is is not what ought
to be,” lamented Thorndike (1962) in his Principles of Teaching (p. 55). Closing
the gap required learning, which meant forming or reinforcing socially appro-
priate stimulus-response bonds and dissolving the less desirable ones. The
control of behavioral change through modification of neurochemical bonds:
This was the business of education, and the charge of educational research was
the discovery of the universal laws by which such modifications took place. As
such, the fundamental phenomena of education were construed as material,
quantifiable, and thus directly amenable to the highly successful statistical
research methods then emanating from British agronomy and biology.
Thorndike’s (1962) epistemological framework transferred the basis for
decision-making from the experiences of the teacher to the experiments of the
researcher. “A child’s mind is never a witch’s pot to be set in action by educa-
tional incantations” (Joncich, 1962, p. 26), remarked Thorndike in opposition to
the experiential lore passed on from teacher to teacher. Rather, teachers should
receive the curriculum and pedagogy from the educational administrator and
researcher respectively whose expertise in statistical methods, psychology, and
neuroanatomy far outweighed the subjective experiences gained from working
with children in situ.
Dewey (1997) advocated a science of education as well, although its epis-
temic basis fundamentally conflicted with that of Thorndike. Trained as a
philosopher, Dewey saw the mind as a complex product of social adaptation
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and rejected Thorndike’s stimulus-response psychology because it neglected
the role of intentionality in human life (Tomlinson, 1997). He agreed with
Thorndike that the mind when left on its own did not develop naturally into a
socially productive organ. However, it was scientific thinking itself, thought
Dewey (1900/1990), that offered children and adults alike entrance into the
kind of informed decision-making and conscientious social action that would
ensure civilized living. It began with reflective thinking, a sort of active inquiry
beyond the face value of an alleged truth or belief, and progressed to the
processes of analysis and synthesis, of breaking apart and rebuilding into
personally meaningful systems, followed by the continual testing of such sys-
tems against personal experience (Dewey, 1910/1997). In doing so, people
began to create systematic knowledge provisionally reconciled against per-
sonal experience, which inevitably led to new areas of confusion for further
scientific consideration. Educational researchers may have had specialized
training in statistical practices, argued Dewey (1929), but it was teachers who
had experiential access to the motives, intents, personalities, and abilities of
children learning in situ. It was not guesswork that the experienced teacher had
to offer, but systematic, practical knowledge, provisionally held and continual-
ly reconciled against actual classroom experience, and that, for Dewey, consti-
tuted the first truly scientific basis for educational decision-making in North
America.
By the 1940s, a generation of the US’s top behavioral scientists had ad-
vanced inferential statistics in the direction of education, owing in large part to
Hotelling (1931), Johnson and Neyman (1936), and Snedecor’s (1934, 1937)
reframing of Fisher’s variance program in social scientific terms a decade
earlier (Rucci & Tweney, 1980). A student of Hotelling at Columbia, Wilks
(1932) developed the multivariate generalization of Fisher’s (1925) analysis of
variance in 1932, one year after Hotelling’s own multivariate generalization of
Student’s t. Johnson, after having studied with Fisher in London, returned to
Minnesota, where he developed with Neyman a covariance technique for
testing linear hypotheses in educational research. According to Rucci and
Tweney (1980), Snedecor’s influence on education took the form of two statis-
tics textbooks, which were “nearly always cited by early psychological research
using variance analysis” (p. 178) until Lindquist’s (1940) Statistical Analysis in
Educational Research emerged as the standard in the field.
Further advances in educational statistics were so plentiful that by that
mid-1940s few researchers cited Fisher, Snedecor, or Lindquist in conjunction
with introductory variance analysis (Little, 2003). Fisher’s initial program,
barely two decades old, had become one of the methodological approaches of
choice in educational research, gaining significant support from the 1947
founding of the Educational Testing Service and the increased demand for
rigorous admissions practices that followed the 1944 passage of the G.I. Bill
(Lagemann, 2000). By the 1950s, courses in variance analysis were prevalent in
graduate programs across the US (Rucci & Tweney, 1980), which served to
further bolster experimental approaches to education (Campbell, 1957; Cron-
bach, 1957).
With the 1950s also came growing disappointment in some circles with the
relatively uncoordinated body of knowledge that had amassed from decades of
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research under Taylor’s and Fisher’s programs. For years hypotheses had been
empirically tested, often in sophisticated ways, and forthcoming claims rightly
given the status of scientific knowledge. But the body of work as a whole
generally failed to aggregate into something larger than the sum of its parts.
Under the banner of the Theory Movement, write Evers and Lakomski (1996),
many scholars worked to replace the “naïve empiricism” of these efforts with a
more rigorous, theoretical approach that would yield a systematic body of
educational knowledge relevant to administration. Enamored of the logical
empiricism of Feigl (1951, 1953), scholars of the Theory Movement advanced a
hypothetico-deductive method of theory-building that involved deducing
specific, observable hypotheses from more general theoretical statements, test-
ing those hypotheses empirically, and either rejecting or accepting them on the
basis of those tests. This web of general theoretical statements formed the
higher-level theory that would unify educational research and direct adminis-
tration, while remaining firmly grounded in empiricism through the hierarchy
of deductive claims that led all the way down to observable, testable hypothe-
ses.
No one was more central to this line of work than Griffiths (1959), yet
according to Evers and Lakomski (1991), even Griffiths failed to meet the
challenging epistemological standards of logical empiricism, though the at-
tempt was valuable in its own right.
Griffiths places great emphasis on identifying and articulating the core
assumptions of his theory; for from these will be derived “a larger set of
empirical laws ”.… The empirical laws are not quite forthcoming, but in their
place Griffiths does specify a set of testable propositions, some major, some
minor, which all taken together represent a serious attempt to create a
hypothetico-deductive structure.… True, there are no purely
logico-mathematical derivations as Feigl’s framework [logical empiricism]
requires, but then administrative theory, then and now, is not a quantitatively
formalized theory. (pp. 56-57)
Another limitation of the Theory Movement was its exclusion of values
from the purview of administrative theory owing to the demand of logical
empiricism that key theoretical terms be empirically definable, that is,
measurable. Evers and Lakomski (1996) offer a clear illustration of the logical
empiricist’s position.
One can test and perhaps confirm hypotheses about school vandalism, noting
patterns of correlation among defined variables. It is, however, something else
again to justify the claim that such vandalism is wrong. The idea here is that
one can observe destruction, or damage to property, or even the suffering
behaviour of others without observing something called wrongness. No matter
how carefully we observe, it is only facts that are ever seen and never values.
(p. 4)
This exclusion of values may have bolstered the image and activity of the
natural sciences, especially physics and chemistry; however, it effectively
alienated administrative theory from the practical concerns of school adminis-
trators, profoundly diminishing their basis for making and defending value-
based decisions in schools—a limitation that became increasingly problematic
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for school superintendents as the US entered the tumultuous years of the 1960s.
(For other criticisms of logical empiricism, see Feyerabend, 1975; Kuhn, 1962.)
The mid-century era also saw the emergence of more socially oriented
perspectives in educational research owing in large part to the founding of the
Committee on Human Development at the University of Chicago (Lagemann,
2000). Among the Committee faculty was social anthropologist W. Lloyd
Warner, whose interest in relationships among social groups led to his devel-
opment of the concept of social class as an integral factor for understanding
human behavior (Warner & Lunt, 1941, 1942; Warner & Srole, 1945). This
aligned in many ways not only with Dewey’s progressive pedagogy, but also
with the insistence by Caroline Zachery of the Progressive Education Associa-
tion that the personal lives of students must be understood through an inves-
tigation of their relationships with others (Pulliam & Van Patten, 1999).
Although, as Lagemann (2000) points out, Warner’s concept of social class was
later criticized on several grounds, his work not only provided an extremely
fruitful analytic framework for socially minded educational researchers inter-
ested in equity issues, but also highlighted the relevance of fieldwork to educa-
tion. Warner, Havighurst, and Loeb’s (1944) Who Shall be Educated? and Davis’s
(1951) Social-Class Influences Upon Learning demarcate this early awareness of
sociocultural factors in education.
Research Programs: 1960-2000
From a cumulative epistemological perspective of the sort advocated by
Campbell (1974), we might expect educational research to have stabilized over
the 20th century into a set of orthodox practices, leaving only a dwindling fate
for those less enduring “fads and fashions” (p. 416) commonplace in theology
and the humanities. Yet the second half of the 20th century experienced a
complex branching of research methods at least on par with the variety of the
first half of the century.
As early as 1923 McCall lamented the difficulty involved in harvesting
meaningful, statistically amenable data from educational settings. Not only
were educational researchers finding the statistical methods themselves trou-
blesome to master, they were finding the reconceptualization of their phenom-
ena in categories amenable to such methods an even more daunting task. It was
an ontological and epistemological problem that remained largely unad-
dressed until 1963 when Campbell and Stanley published Experimental and
Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research.
Campbell and Stanley’s (1963) text offered a full-scale endorsement of ex-
perimentation as “the only available route to cumulative progress” (p. 3). The
aim of the educational experiment was to determine through quantitative
comparison whether and to what extent a particular “intervention” affected
student performance. Research methods offered an increasingly rigorous way
to make the quantitative comparisons, but it was the design of the experiment,
argued Campbell and Stanley, that determined the degree to which those
comparisons represented the effect of the intervention rather than the effect of
confounding variables on student performance. Such was the rationale for the
16 research designs explored in detail in their text, to which I now briefly turn.
Characterized as a minimum point of entry into research, pre-experimental
designs lacked random assignment. As such, any conclusion about the effect of
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the interaction drawn from pre-experimental observations presupposed an
expectation of what the data would have looked like if the intervention had not
occurred. In one-shot case studies in which an intervention is followed by a
single observation, the researcher had no second group for comparison and
therefore could offer no assurance that any feature of the observation was
caused by the intervention. By observing before and after the intervention,
one-group pretest-posttest designs improved on the isolation of the effect of
the intervention by including two observations. However, the researcher was
still unable to offer any assurance that the observation was not caused by
confounding variables such as history, maturation, or testing. Conclusions
drawn about the effect in this case must rest on the assumption that the pre-test
and the post-test observations would have been equal if not for the interven-
tion.
True experimental designs solved the problem of comparison group
equivalence by introducing random assignment. This required the researcher
to assign half the participants randomly to an intervention group and half to a
control group. This ensured that any confounding factors would be equally
distributed among both groups, which enabled the researcher to attribute more
reasonably any difference between observations to the intervention. In other
words, randomization provided a logical rather than an empirical warrant for
assuming that post-test observations of the control and intervention groups
would have been equal if not for the intervention.
In naturalistic social settings, where researchers were often unable to exert
“full experimental control” over the setting, Campbell and Stanley (1963) advo-
cated quasi-experimental designs. Although they are not particularly appropri-
ate for the testing of causal laws or the overall “generation of causal
understanding” (Cook, 1983, p. 80), quasi-experimental designs are often de-
scribed as well suited for probing ostensible cause-and-effect relationships in
particular situations. In the separate-sample pretest-posttest design, for ex-
ample, two randomly equivalent groups are observed, one before and one after
the intervention. Although conclusions about the effect of the intervention
remain susceptible to history, this quasi-experimental design offers a substan-
tial improvement over the one-group pretest-posttest pre-experimental design
by eliminating testing as a confounding variable (Campbell & Stanley). Such
designs are unified in their attempt to eliminate the possibility of variables
other than the intervention influencing their quantitative comparison of obser-
vations.
Yet at the very moment that Campbell and Stanley (1963) were reaffirming
controlled experimentation as “the only means for settling disputes regarding
educational practice,” a growing number of educational researchers were turn-
ing to ethnography for a means of inquiring into what Spindler (1982) had first
called in 1954 “the sociocultural contextualization of schooling” (Lagemann,
2000, p. 220). Returning to the tradition begun by Warner and Davis in
Chicago, this next generation of educational researchers embraced participant
observation and interviewing as important tools for understanding the lives of
school children. At first, the assumption that such lives could be distilled to a
common set of formal properties and documented through objective life narra-
tives guided the process of inquiry, and many ethnographers of this phase tried
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to operate within experimental and quasi-experimental traditions (Rosaldo,
1989). Boys in White (Becker, Geer, Hughes, & Strauss, 1961) well illustrates this
early mixed-method approach. “Firmly entrenched in mid-century method-
ological discourse,” write Denzin and Lincoln (1994, p. 8), “this work at-
tempted to make qualitative research as rigorous as its quantitative
counterpart.… This multimethod work combined open-ended and quasi-
structured interviewing with participant observation and careful analysis of
such materials in standardized, statistical form.” Yet with the publication of
Geertz’s (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures, ethnography found its interpretive
basis. In a chord similar to that of Dewey’s, Geertz announced:
The concept of culture I espouse … is essentially a semiotic one. Believing, with
Max Weber, that man [sic] is an animal suspended in webs of significance he
himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be
therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one
in search of meaning. (p. 5)
For Geertz, culture was not reducible to behavior. Rather, it was the “web of
significance” in which particular behaviors became meaningful, for it is only in
particular cultural contexts that eye twitches become winks and coughs be-
come heckles, and it was the goal of interpretive ethnography to describe as
richly and as intimately as possible the spectrum of those meaningful actions,
those “flecks of culture,” idiosyncratic as they may be, rather than focus on
what Thorndike (1962) might have called their material or behavioral counter-
parts.
In place of experimentation leading to covering laws, Geertz (1973)
proposed participant observation and interviewing leading to “thick descrip-
tion” (p. 312); in place of objective life narratives, he suggested interpretive
essays from the situated standpoint of the ethnographer. It was not the promise
of objective, statistically reliable knowledge that imbued the educational eth-
nographer with credibility, but the kind of contoured understanding that
comes from prolonged, intimate, and dynamic interaction with children. Thus
to the battery of quantitative practices common to educational research were
added the relatively exotic cadre of interviewing, participant observation, per-
sonal reflection, and literary analysis (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994).
With the founding of the Council on Anthropology and Education in 1970,
educational anthropology gained considerable legitimacy in the university
(Eddy, 1985), and by the early 1980s at least four distinct varieties had emerged:
anthroethnography, socioethnography, psychoethnography, and critical eth-
nography (LeCompte & Preissle, 1993; Spindler, 1982). But qualitative accounts
of classroom life were conducted not only by visiting ethnographers, but also
by classroom teachers, who under the emerging rubric of action research were
turning to a variety of more accessible researcher methods as a means of
improving their own pedagogy (Cornell, 1969). Introduced by Kurt Lewin
(Adelman, 1993) and his students as early as the 1930s, action research began as
a series of quasi-experiments conducted in factory and close-knit community
settings. Lewin was convinced that many of the everyday organizational
problems he experienced could be solved through direct, democratic participa-
tion among all parties involved. The process began with “reflective thought,
discussion, decision, and action by ordinary people participating in collective
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research,” explained Adelman (p. 8), and the results of the implemented ac-
tions were generally measured quantitatively through passive observation or
surveys.
No doubt owing partly to the onset of World War II, but also largely to
factors unknown, the momentum of Lewin’s action research agenda was
stalled until the 1980s (Lagemann, 2000). By then, the infusion of qualitative
methods loosened action research from its quasi-experimental origins, and the
movement became increasingly associated with discussion, observation, inter-
viewing, and journal-writing. Among teachers engaged in classroom action
research, Schratz (1993) noted a recurrent transition from a steadfast reliance
on what he called the “traditional positivist approach” (p. 120) to research to an
acceptance of the interpretive practices of critical inquiry, largely effected by
the realization that many of the classroom experiences of interest were unlikely
to be adequately represented through traditional survey techniques.
A more recent response to positivism has come in the form of Evers and
Lakomski’s (1991, 1996, 2000) program in naturalistic coherentism. Central to
this program is the notion of coherence as an epistemic value. Following
Kuhn’s (1962) criticism of logical empiricism, Evers and Lakomski acknowl-
edge that observation does not necessarily lead to the assent of one theory over
another—in other words, observation is not, contra Feigl, the independent
arbiter of competing theories in science. Observations may, for example, result
in a theory being slightly modified but not rejected; observations may even
confirm two or more theories. Therefore, the foundation of a science of educa-
tion cannot be the so-called “brute facts” of objective science on which educa-
tors of earlier generations relied so heavily. “The upshot,” remark Evers and
Lakomski (2001), “is holism, the view that an administrative theory and its
purported empirical evidence are part of a whole body of knowledge, or global
theory, that is adjudicated by coherence criteria of excellence” (p. 502). From
the perspective of naturalistic coherentism, how well a body of knowledge
hangs together as a coherent whole—from its generalized theoretical state-
ments to its anecdotal observations—should stand as the primary concern
among educational administrators choosing between competing frameworks.
Regarding methods, Evers and Lakomski (2001) explain,
We are … free to start with whatever qualitative or quantitative formulations
of patterns, or regularities, or explanations, or understandings, hold the
promise of suggesting order where there is apparent disorder. But during the
process of theory building, these accounts will be successively winnowed, or
developed, in ways that extend the scope of theory, while maintaining
coherence with natural science. (p. 507)
In keeping with its naturalistic orientation, a preferred theory of educa-
tional administration, then, should accord well with established theories in
natural science that speak to human learning and behavior as well as with
experiential lore established in the context of daily administration. In this
sense, Evers and Lakomski’s (2001) program is Deweyan in the sense that it
values active inquiry in naturalistic settings, leading to practical knowledge
provisionally held and continually reconciled against larger frameworks. It is
also Thorndikian in its suggestion that such practical knowledge should be
reconciled against generalized scientific laws of human learning and behavior,
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neuroscience in particular. Naturalistic coherentism attempts to bring together
theory, even in its most generalized forms, with practice in all its situatedness.
To borrow from Geertz (1973), it aims to wed experimental science in search of
law with interpretive science in search of in situ meaning in an attempt to
provide administrators with a body of scientific work relevant to their needs.
Situating Research Methods in Social Settings
At the base of all knowledge—all meaning—are humans, positioned in par-
ticular social relations, using language, literacy, and other symbolic forms to
induce adherence (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969), agreement (Rorty,
1987), conviction (Grimaldi, 1972), cooperation (Burke, 1990): in a word, to
persuade. That humans occupy the focal position in this image represents a
departure from the dominant world view created by Descartes over 300 years
ago. In that world view, self-evidence provided the foundation for the prize of
science: certain knowledge. By divesting himself of all knowledge that was
merely plausible or probable, Descartes foregrounded self-evidence as the only
reasonable starting point for a system of rational thought, and apodictic proof
was touted as the only means of extending the certainty of self-evidence to
other statements (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca). Gone were the “prejudices of
our childhood,” announced Descartes, “principles of which I allowed myself in
youth to be persuaded without having inquired into their truth” (Durant &
Durant, 1989, p. 638). All that remained were the clear, distinct statements that
could be reduced to immediate perception: the axioms of Euclid’s Elements, for
example, and the famous Je pense, donc je suis. Self-evidence was thought to
speak for itself: It was essentially unmediated, certain, and thus beyond the
realm of deliberation for Descartes, and on its immunity to interpretation
Cartesian foundationalism rested and still rests today.
Antifoundational perspectives of the sort with which I open this section are,
of course, not new. As early as the fifth century BC, the Sophists ardently
defended the position that all human knowledge is provisional and inevitably
the product of persuasion, Descartes’ self-evidence notwithstanding. Twenty-
two centuries later, Italian professor of rhetoric Giambattista Vico returned to
this point when he challenged Descartes’ philosophy. In “On the Study Meth-
ods of Our Time,” Vico argued that Descartes’s method, like all other human
endeavors, rests on probability, belief, argument, and conviction rather than on
infallible demonstrations of absolute truth; he thus named rhetoric the most
suitable field for studying human knowledge, for, as Bizzell and Herzberg
(1990) explain, “rhetoric takes probability seriously, understands the ways in
which argument produces belief, and trains young people for responsible civic
action, as Cartesianism does not” (p. 11).
Nor are antifoundational perspectives necessarily old. The notion that ob-
servations provide a noninterpretive basis for scientific knowledge had en-
dured longstanding criticism (Dewey, 1916/1944; James, 1896/1992), but it
was Hanson’s (1958) Patterns of Discovery that crystallized the issue. Based on
the results of his now-classic psychological experiment in human perception,
Hanson argued that observers’ background knowledge influences even their
most immediate visual perceptions. Phillips (1985) explained the experiment.
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Slides were made from cards selected from a deck, and these cards were
projected for very short periods onto a screen in front of various observers. The
slides were all correctly identified, except for one that was a trick slide where
the card was given the wrong color (for example, a black six of hearts). Most
commonly the observers in the experiment saw this trick slide as a blur, or they
misidentified the suit of the card. (p. 41)
Hanson (1958) then generalized the results of this experiment to scientific
knowledge production as a whole and argued from persuasive, empirical
grounds that scientific observations are inevitably theory-laden and interpre-
tive in nature, thus severely undermining “those philosophical positions that
suggest knowledge is built up from a neutral or objective observational base”
(Phillips, 1985, p. 41).
With the publication of Kuhn’s (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
came further support for antifoundational perspectives. By portraying the
history of science as a series of incommensurable paradigms connected
through periods of crisis and revolution that resembled religious conversions
more than a cumulative march toward certain knowledge, Kuhn effectively
situated knowledge claims in the theories, assumptions, and practices of their
sponsoring paradigms. Central to his thesis was the point that the methods of
science drastically underdetermine forthcoming knowledge claims. “Observa-
tion and experience can and must drastically restrict the range of admissible
scientific belief” wrote Kuhn (1997), “but they cannot alone determine a par-
ticular body of such belief” (p. 4).
More recently, Rorty’s (1999) appreciation for the role of persuasion in
research has garnered particular attention. Rorty has admitted being surprised
by the severe hostility that his ideas have received from popular audiences
who have little or no interest in philosophy or rhetoric. “These denunciations
[against Rorty] claim,” according to Rorty, “that unless the youth is raised to
believe in moral absolutes, and in objective truth, civilization is doomed” (pp.
xxviii-xxix). Indeed, few words are held in lower regard than persuasion:
Replacing talk of proof with that of persuasion in all but the most devalued
human endeavors seems generally to lead to the breakdown of constructive
communication, especially with audiences—whether popular, scientific,
religious, or otherwise—who approach their topic with a sense of reverence.
Yet by persuasion, explained Grimaldi (1972), “we are simply accepting the
inescapable fact that in all areas of human living there are large complexes of
pre-existing convictions and assumptions within which we must attempt to
speak to the other” (p. 4). Appreciating the role of persuasion in research does
not devalue knowledge; it simply acknowledges, to borrow from James
(1896/1992), that because “no bell in us tolls to let us know for certain when
truth is in our grasp” (p. 478) no claim to knowledge is beyond deliberation.
What we consider true, what we consider self-evident, what we consider
absurd or natural or logical: None of this comes to us by unmediated means,
regardless of how obvious it might seem to a particular arrangement of people
of a particular place at a particular time. In fact it does not “come to us” at all.
From Grimaldi’s perspective, knowledge production is a process of construing
claims to the best of our abilities out of what we consider to be the convincing
material at hand, and knowledge transmission is a process of convincing others
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of the veracity of such claims. With Cartesian notions of self-evidence, logic,
and method out of the way, the longstanding distinction between episteme and
doxa becomes problematic, and the whole of inquiry and knowledge produc-
tion materializes as the proper province of what Aristotle (1991) had limited to
the political, judicial, and ceremonial spheres of Greek life, namely, rhetoric,
the art of finding the available means of persuasion in a given case.
From this perspective, educational research becomes a strategic endeavor.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) explain:
Every speech is addressed to an audience and it is frequently forgotten that this
applies to everything written as well. Whereas a speech is conceived in terms
of an audience, the physical absence of his [sic] readers can lead a writer to
believe that he is alone in the world, though his text is always conditioned,
whether consciously or unconsciously, by those persons he wishes to address.
(pp. 6-7)
We inquire and produce knowledge while anticipating its function in the social
world, also realizing that our claims will be evaluated against the procedures
and norms considered relevant by our audience (Bazerman, 1994a). Audiences
need not reconstitute the meanings we have intended: Claims meant to sup-
port one cause can be used to support another. Evidence that seems strong to
an author can be interpreted as weak by a reader or by another author who
embeds that evidence in a different intertext altogether (Bazerman, 1993).
Denzin and Lincoln (1994) indirectly acknowledge the textual underpin-
nings of educational research. In “Entering the Field of Qualitative Research,”
they remark, “Thus the narratives, or stories, scientists tell are accounts
couched and framed within specific storytelling traditions, often defined as
paradigms” (p. 3). Their table (p. 13) delineating the major features of five
epistemic paradigms in educational research goes so far as to include a column
on types of narration, including scientific reports, ethnographic fiction, fables,
dramas, and scholarly essays. Less directly, in their discussion of the qualita-
tive researcher as a sort of Jack-of-all-trades, they explain, “The bricoleur
produces a bricolage, that is, a pieced-together, close-knit set of practices that
provide solutions to problems in a concrete situation” (p. 2, my emphasis). It is
important to realize that these traditions of storytelling and types of narra-
tion—genres in short—are sociocultural products of decades or centuries of
historical conditioning. To borrow from Miller (1984), genres are stabilized
literate responses to recurrent social exigencies, typified literate acts, according
to Russell (1997), that “worked once and might work again” (p. 515). They
represent not only regularity in textual features “on the page” but also
regularity in the social interactions and situations mediated by those texts,
regularity “off the page,” so to speak, including shared beliefs, assumptions,
purposes, motives, reader-writer relations, and configurations of trust and
authority (Bazerman, 1988, 1994b, 1997; Little, in press; Miller, 1984; Russell,
1997). In short, texts fall into the same genre based not only on what they look
like, but also on how they are used, and the decades-long articulation of that
usage by modern scholars of rhetoric—from Bitzer’s (1968) early statement on
rhetorical situation to recent reformulations of context by Bazerman and Rus-
sell (2003) in the light of Soviet activity theory—represents an enormous and
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promising resource for further elaborating in practical terms what we as edu-
cational researchers mean by context and situation vis-à-vis epistemic practice.
Given this perspective, several contours in the history of educational re-
search come to the fore. The early-20th century challenge of mass education, for
example, included important changes not only in student demographics, but
also in the communicative practices required to accomplish the business of
education. These in turn had an effect on what were considered appropriate
research methods. The routine face-to-face interactions and relatively informal
textual exchanges of the cloistered era of education no longer sufficed under
the pressure of public scrutiny. By 1900, educational leaders were pressed to
defend their decisions to geographically distant and largely distrustful audien-
ces who had little or no expertise in educational matters. As such, what began
to accomplish the communicative work of educational administration were
formal texts such as scientific articles and cost-benefit reports, the standardized
textual elements and explicit norms of interpretation of which assisted in the
reliable reconstitution of meaning by the relevant parties. These texts served
the important function of communicating evidence of educational quality in
terms that their intended political and public audiences found convincing and
useful. Accordingly, the research methods that were compatible with the fea-
tures of these formal texts were legitimized, and those that were not were
largely marginalized—in education.
I emphasize in education to point out the fact that research methods per se
are neither good nor bad: Only by understanding their function in particular
communities can we begin to evaluate them and then only in terms of their
usefulness in responding to the exigencies at hand. For the academic psycho-
logists who led the “defection” from controlled experimentation in the 1920s,
qualitative observation and reporting turned out to be a viable paradigm,
given their interest in better understanding the lives of children, the relatively
high degree of credibility they enjoyed, the relatively low-stakes nature of their
work, and their ability to find or found social networks that valued their work.
For the educational administrators of the day, however, whose goals and
audiences were essentially fixed by recurrent public scrutiny and criticism that
left little room for interpersonal trust, the naturalistic methods of academic
psychology offered little promise of success. Understandably, their configura-
tion of legitimized and marginalized genres and attendant research methods
differed from that of the academic psychologists; not only were the two groups
responding to different demands from anticipated audiences, they were
operating at largely different degrees of autonomy.
In this light, it is understandable why Thorndike’s version of educational
science was generally preferred to Dewey’s: For despite the marked shifts in
education at the turn of the century, Dewey remained committed to a highly
contextual form of educational research that framed knowledge consumption
and decision-making as local or at times personal affairs. One of the primary
purposes of Dewey’s Laboratory School was “to exhibit, test, verify, and
criticize theoretical statements; [and] … to add to the sum of facts and prin-
ciples in its special line” (Lagemann, 1989, p. 197). Yet in Dewey’s framework,
“testing” was accomplished to the satisfaction of the people who worked at the
Laboratory School in the spirit of democratic participation. Such an intimate
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scope of social interaction encouraged the production of knowledge that was
qualitative in nature, highly dependent on the shared expectations and norms
of the immediate audience, and thus not easily communicable through formal
texts or otherwise to the distant audiences that were becoming increasingly
relevant to educational funding.
Thorndike’s research methods, on the other hand, produced a kind of
knowledge that aligned exceedingly well with the procedures and norms con-
sidered relevant by the new audience of education. Whereas Dewey gave
priority to naturalistic settings like those offered at his Laboratory School,
Thorndike’s statistical research program required controlled experiments in
which all the contextual cues that Dewey had privileged were subdued. Study-
ing animal behavior was one way to reduce human learning to its core proces-
ses; experimental designs in controlled laboratory settings that eschewed all
but the pivotal stimuli were another. By these practices, researchers could come
to know the essential nature of human learning as well as the most efficient
ways to form, reinforce, and dissolve the stimulus-response bonds that would
literally cause socially appropriate behavior. What Dewey sacrificed in rigor,
however, Thorndike sacrificed in educative relevance. His redefinition of the
phenomena of education in quantifiable terms required him, like Fechner and
Galton before him, to jettison much of what Dewey considered the essential
material of education (Hornstein, 1988). Speed became a cardinal index of
ability, no doubt influenced by the efficiency movement, but also owing to its
amenability to quantitative measurement and objective decision-making:
Good readers were those who could read fast; good teachers were those who
could complete an educational objective in the least amount of time. However,
crucial to Thorndike’s success was the fact that these quantitative figures were
easily communicable to distant audiences through formal texts, and what is
more, generally interpreted by those audiences as intuitively obvious indices of
educational quality and therefore seen as palpable decision points for educa-
tional administration. This enabled fair, seemingly context-free, though by no
means pedagogically meaningful decisions to be made at a time when educa-
tional leaders were under severe political pressure to do so. In short,
Thorndike’s epistemic practices offered precisely the kind of textual artifacts
that educational administrators needed to succeed in the increasingly relevant
sphere of public deliberation.
Another set of textual contours not addressed in the historical literature
surrounds the emergence of interpretive ethnography. Above I noted that with
Geertz’s (1973) ethnography came the addition of interviewing, participant
observation, personal reflection, and literary analysis to the existing battery of
descriptive, correlational, and experimental practices generally used in empiri-
cal research. Yet it would be a mistake to assume that all these epistemic
practices were meant to be used in the same communicative situations, that
they implied even roughly the same audiences, or that they placed similar
demands on consumers of knowledge. By far the majority of the quantitative
literature, from Thorndike through Campbell and Stanley, although steeped in
specialized knowledge implies a nearly universal audience of rational people
and works to achieve consensus among them: The literature operates from the
standpoint that the goal of any scientific article is to encourage all rational
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people to come to the same conclusion as the author, to induce mental ad-
herence so to speak—not by trusting the author, but by judging for oneself
through rational processes which conclusions are merited and which are not,
and toward this end the statistical epistemic practices of educational psycholo-
gy, coupled with the emergence of conventions to constrain the interpretation
of data, worked effectively.
In contrast, Geertz’s (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures makes no promise of
interpretive stability. In fact he considers the wide variety of candidate mean-
ings invokable by thick descriptions as a strong point, as multiple ways of
engaging the reader, multiple ways of connecting the audience to the phenom-
enon under examination. That the product of Geertz’s nuanced epistemic
practices—a descriptive essay—relies heavily on individuals’ scientific im-
agination and powers of clarity implies a social setting in which the prospect of
widely divergent reconstitutions of meaning is of negligible consequence or
perhaps even encouraged altogether. This is not a genre that leads to high-
stakes decision-making, nor should it given Geertz’s professional standing as
an academic cultural anthropologist and his vision for interpretive ethnog-
raphy. Others may have higher-stakes social settings in mind for the enactment
of interpretive ethnography; however, this scenario would require a tremen-
dous degree of trust on the part of all people involved: trust not only in an
underlying harmony among their individual powers of clarity and scientific
imaginations, but also in the impeccable research skills of the ethnographer.
Conclusion
“The roads to knowledge are many,” wrote Eisner (1985) in his preface to the
Eighty-Fourth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education. Indeed,
the proliferation of research methods in education is here to stay, and we need
not only to bring these practices into the spotlight of formal examination, but
also to find improved ways of thinking about and choosing among them: ways
that move beyond the longstanding categories of qualitative and quantitative
research to bridge researchers rather than isolate them.
One way to complement traditional ways of framing research methods is to
recognize the practical reality that as researchers, we are called to write: We are
called to produce certain kinds of texts in certain social settings for certain
kinds of audiences. “Whenever we notice ourselves as writers,” noted Bazer-
man (1994a), “we find ourselves on a spot, a spot that seems to demand of us
that we write” (p. 10). This spot is no less real for the educational researcher
than it is for the essayist or novelist. As such, a communicative situation
becomes an essential factor in choosing appropriate research methods, which
in turn implicates such concepts as audience, style, credibility, and genre as
integral to the business of educational research. This is a larger issue than
simply choosing a venue for publication. By looking beyond publication to the
forms of social action we hope to sponsor by our published writing, and by
examining the social settings that typically embed those forms of action, we can
improve the potential efficacy of our work and move beyond the limiting
notion that our work is complete when it has been accepted by the journal
editor. In their Writing Selves/Writing Societies, Bazerman and Russell (2003)
express this perspective succinctly:
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Writing is alive when it is being written, read, remembered, contemplated,
followed—when it is part of human activity. Otherwise it is dead on the page,
devoid of meaning, devoid of influence, worthless. The signs on the page serve
to mediate between people, activate their thoughts, direct their attention,
coordinate their actions, provide means of relationship. It is in the context of
their activities that people consider texts and give meaning to texts. And it is in
the organization of activities that people find the needs, stances, interactions,
tasks that orient their attention toward texts they write and read. (p. 1)
By recognizing and appreciating this, we can begin to choose research methods
based on the work we intend to accomplish rather than continuing to allow
that choice to be made through tacit enculturation into the epistemic
paradigms of our mentors.
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